The Semantics of “Sanctuary”: Why Sanctuary Cities are no safe haven

Ben Darlow and Charlie Eastaugh*

Westminster AbbeyTalk of “sanctuary cities” has become flavour of the day in recent months, with a growing interest in their legality and—to the contrary—the unconstitutionality of federal attempts to attack such havens (as demonstrated by a January 2017 Executive Order, analysed by Garett Epps here). Volokh Conspiracy bloggers at the Washington Post have provided insightful commentary in line with the growing interest in this complicated area of constitutional law, including a helpful overview from Ilya Somin here, and executive order analysis here. This week David Post cited the English Legal History Blog, in arguing that the moniker “sanctuary” is misapplied and misleading. We will attempt to support such a claim in more detail.

Contemporary American legal context
Decades-old Supreme Court precedent gives us constitutional context for this issue. First, New York v. United States (1992) made clear that the 10th Amendment prevents “commandeering” of state governments to enforce participation in federal regulatory programmes. This was applied to the criminal context in Printz v. United States (1997), where a 5-4 majority led by the late Justice Scalia held unconstitutional certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on similar anti-commandeering grounds.

In NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)—as helpfully flagged by Somin—federal funding conditions with the effect of such commandeering are also unconstitutional. In sum, cities (or even full states) are free to operate in a way that rejects federal cooperation, especially with respect to immigration policies and legislative requirements such as that contained in Section 1373 of the United States federal code (8 U.S.C. § 1373). Section 1373 mandates cooperation between states and the federal Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the January 2017 Executive Order has threatened to attach funds to that requirement. Making funding conditional on such strictures is likely to engage a constitutional question under the 10th Amendment (as outlined above), the 4th Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the 14th Amendment’s due process clause, which have been held applicable to “persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.”

The English common law privilege of Sanctuary was born out of principles that pre-date the common law itself. The basis, definition, and limitations of Sanctuary lead to the strong conclusion that the semantics of naming US immigration havens as “sanctuary cities” is at best misleading and ill-founded. At worst, it severely muddies the waters of discussion, preventing serious analysis in this important area. Appreciating the origins of common law Sanctuary is therefore vital to understanding contemporary use of the term.

Origins of Ecclesiastical Sanctuary
St. Augustine of Rome’s successful conversion of the Saxons to Christianity in the 6th Century AD introduced the idea of ecclesiastical Sanctuary to the ruling Saxon King, Aethelbert. In 597 AD—in support of his newly-adopted religion—Aethelbert introduced severe penalties for interrupting the peace of the Church. Clearly, the concept of Sanctuary at its English origin was, and remained to be until its abolition, an ecclesiastical principle and a creature of the Christian Church.

Sanctuary’s original intention in these earliest times was to protect a criminal from the devastating impact of vigilante justice at the hands of his own family and friends—fundamentally opposed to the contemporary notion of an asylum-seeker, who is likely to find refuge with those close to them. Sanctuary was used to nullify the blood feuds that wreaked havoc in Saxon communities and itself interfered with the pre-cursor to sovereign jurisdiction. William the Conqueror—upon his successful conquest of Saxon England in 1066—adopted many of the Saxon laws already in place, including those of Sanctuary. Later Norman Kings continued to support this privilege without controversy.

Around 1250, English common law was clear: a criminal could take Sanctuary in Churches; other consecrated ground; or even within the confines of a consecrated cemetery—it was fundamentally an Ecclesiastical privilege. If the fleeing criminal had no physical ground in which to take refuge, his Sanctuary began as soon as he placed his hand on the Church door. At this time, Sanctuary was still intended to give the common law legal process sufficient time to effectively run its course and not to provide indefinite refuge to criminals. It was a requirement for the criminal to admit his guilt—again drawing a stark contrast with any modern engagement of the term.

Indeed, it was a settled common law principle in the 13th Century that Sanctuary should last no longer than 40 days. After that period had ended, the Church was no longer allowed to provide food to the criminal and the authorities seeking the criminal hoped this would starve him out of his Sanctuary. Any person providing sustenance after the 40 days could be convicted as an accessory to the criminal’s original crime. Thereafter, the criminal had three options open to him. One, he could surrender, two, be exiled from the country at the escort of the authorities, or three: flee to another Sanctuary to begin a fresh 40 day limitation period. The extent to which this Sanctuary-hopping occurred is unclear, but certainly the privilege of Sanctuary was open to abuse.

Sanctuary curtailed
Over the next two centuries, due to abuses of Sanctuary, English public opinion developed to view the practice as the Church openly harbouring criminals. There are even instances of criminals in London successfully running their nefarious activities from within the confines of a Sanctuary. This abuse of Sanctuary was abhorrent to the English public and was seen as far removed from its original intentions as a safe haven from vigilante justice.

Sanctuary was later diluted in 1504 when King Henry VII successfully asked Pope Innocent VIII to allow the authorities to enter Churches and apprehend a criminal when they committed a fresh crime whilst taking Sanctuary. This was an attempt to curb the abuses mentioned above. Henry VIII followed in his father’s footsteps and initiated further reforms. A significant case in 1519 involving St. John’s Priory and Westminster Abbey (two large sanctuaries) challenged the remit of Sanctuary for murder and other heinous crimes. Henry was moved to state that: “I will have [Sanctuary] reformed which has been encroached by abuse, and brought back to the true intention of the makers”.

In 1540, the English Parliament abolished the use of Sanctuaries for the worst crimes such as murder, rape, and arson. It had already been abolished for High Treason. Following these restrictions, Henry VIII established eight Sanctuary cities where approved asylum seekers had to remain permanently. These national Sanctuaries quickly fell out of use in the reign of Henry’s son, Edward VI, in the mid-16th Century.

During his reign, Henry VIII attempted to restrict the use of Sanctuary by making it unappealing for criminals. A Sanctuary seeker had to wear a 10-inch badge on their upper arm, often had to adhere to a curfew, and had to be branded with an ‘A’ on their right thumb. A 16th Century Sanctuary became something much more closely aligned with a gulag than a haven of respite: not something the Constitutional Framers would transpose over a century later.

Following continued controversy, negative public opinion and the numerous restrictions outlined above, Parliament finalised the reform in 1624 by passing a Statute that stated “no Sanctuary or Privilege of Sanctuary shall be hereafter admitted or allowed in any case”. Plainly, 150 years prior to American Independence, the English principle of Sanctuary had been diluted into obscurity, with the original concept of a place of haven long consigned to the annals of history, excluded from the common law.

It is worth noting at this juncture that there was no mention of Sanctuary Cities (or anything like them) in the 85 Federalist Papers, nor in the 1787 Constitutional Convention. Although the Founders did describe the Capitol as a “sanctuary of liberty” and Jefferson remarked that it would be the nation’s “first temple”, no illusions were made as to the importance of federalism, the notion that states’ rights were fundamental to a successfully operating Republic, and the separation of Church and State.

Constitutional Convention

The 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia: no mention of Sanctuary Cities

Closing remarks
As the foregoing outline has shown, the common law principle of Sanctuary is an English ecclesiastical principle deriving from early Christianity. Its status as a bargaining chip between the Church and the State in the 15th and 16th Centuries led to its ultimate abolition as a common law practice, far removed from its haven-providing origin. The Philadelphia Convention of the late 18th Century included an emphatic decision to separate the Church from the State, with the Union founded on this secular basis. According to long-standing judicial precedent it is plainly unconstitutional under the republican Constitution for the federal Government to commandeer sovereign state cities for its own bidding in an unfettered way. Contemporary American usage of the term “sanctuary cities”—as has become de rigeur in modern political discourse—cannot be divorced from the historical (originalist) underpinnings of the term “Sanctuary”. To do so causes injury to tenets of federalism, constitutional law, and endangers the secularity of the debate.


*Charlie Eastaugh is a Visiting Fellow at the University of Surrey and he has a PhD in US Constitutional Law.
His contributions were limited to those of legal accuracy and any criticism or opinion expressed in this commentary remains that of the English Legal History Blog.
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BOOK RECOMMENDATION: Granville Sharp’s Cases on Slavery

Granville Sharp’s Cases on SlaveryGranville Sharp image

Andrew Lyall

The purpose of Granville Sharp’s Cases on Slavery is twofold: first, to publish previously unpublished legal materials principally in three important cases in the 18th century on the issue of slavery in England, and specifically the status of black people who were slaves in the American colonies or the West Indies and who were taken to England by their masters. The unpublished materials are mostly verbatim transcripts made by shorthand writers commissioned by Granville Sharp, one of the first Englishmen to take up the cause of the abolition of the slave trade and slavery itself. Other related unpublished material is also made available for the first time, including an opinion of an attorney general and some minor cases from the library of York Minster.

The second purpose, outlined in the Introduction, is to give a social and legal background to the cases and an analysis of the position in England of black servants/slaves brought to England and the legal effects of the cases, taking into account the new information provided by the transcripts. There was a conflict in legal authorities as to whether black servants remained slaves, or became free on arrival in England.

Lord Mansfield, the chief justice of the court of King’s Bench, was a central figure in all the cases and clearly struggled to come to terms with slavery. The material provides a basis for tracing the evolution of his thought on the subject. On the one hand, the huge profits from slave production in the West Indies flooded into England, slave owners had penetrated the leading institutions in England and the pro-slavery lobby was influential. On the other hand, English law had over time established rights and liberties which in the 18th century were seen by many as national characteristics. That tradition was bolstered by the ideas of the Enlightenment.

By about the 1760s it had become clear that there was no property in the person, and by the 1770s that such servants could not be sent abroad without their consent, but whether they owed an obligation of perpetual service remained unresolved.

Dr Andrew Lyall is a retired member of staff in Law at University College Dublin.

February 2017   |    9781509911219   |   448pp  |   Hardback  |   RSP: £60

Discount Price: £48

Click here to order online and use the discount code CV7 at the checkout to get your 20% off

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History of the Referendum

referendum-picture

It is fair to say that the result of the United Kingdom’s Referendum on continued membership of the European Union is one of the most controversial and fiercely debated topics in modern English Legal History. Rafts of previously silent Constitutional Lawyers have entered the arena to voice their opinions.

This ferocity has been an enduring theme surrounding Referendums since the earliest discussions regarding their introduction. The central pillar of controversy is that Referendums are arguably contrary to the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty. This is the principle that Parliament, acting by its Members and Lords, can make or unmake any law whatsoever. Theoretically, if Parliament wants to pass an Act that mandates the slaughter of all blue-eyed boys, Parliament can do so. Practically this might present difficulties, but it is correct as a matter of English Constitutional Law.

The greatest advocate of Parliamentary Sovereignty was Constitutional theorist Albert Venn Dicey in 1885. Bizarrely, it was also Dicey who first advocated the introduction of Referendums in an 1890 article, a mere 5 years after the publication of his renowned text on Parliamentary Sovereignty. Dicey believed that Referendums could act as a direct democratic check against the corruption of elected parties. Dicey stated that the people could act as ‘Political Sovereign’.

Dicey wanted a Referendum on the subject of Irish Home Rule to try to defeat Ireland’s attempt to govern itself in the late 19th Century, but he was unsuccessful. In the early 1900s, Members of the Conservative party suggested using a Referendum every time the House of Commons and House of Lords disagreed on a Bill, but this was roundly rejected. Moreover, in 1903 Joseph Chamberlain unsuccessfully suggested a Referendum on the issue of tariff reform. This reform, fittingly, was to be a departure from free trade towards imposing custom duties on foreign imports.

The other main suggestion of this era (again rejected) was made by Winston Churchill in 1910 who recommended a Referendum as a means of answering the question of Women’s Suffrage.

Over the next several decades, the idea of Referendums became increasingly unpopular in England due to their use by dictators as a tool of oppression. By way of example, Hitler held a Referendum in 1934 to effectively give himself ultimate State power. Groups of people were escorted to polling stations by Nazi soldiers and then had to vote in public. Some ballot papers were pre-ticked ‘Yes’ and forgeries were so common in some regions of Germany that the number of votes cast was greater than the total number of people entitled to vote.

The next major suggestion was again made by Winston Churchill in 1945 to answer the question of whether his Second World War government coalition should continue until Japan had been defeated. In response, Clement Atlee described the concept of Referendums as ‘alien to all of our traditions’. In the decades after the Second World War, Referendums were barely mentioned; no issue seemed important enough to warrant a Referendum. Atlee’s sentiment was echoed by Margaret Thatcher in the 1970s, however this did not dissuade Harold Wilson from promising and implementing the first ever UK nationwide Referendum in 1975.

The United Kingdom has only held 3 nationwide Referendums. The first was on 5 June 1975 to decide whether to continue as a member of the European Economic Community (now the European Union) (67.23% Yes), the second was on 5 May 2011 to decide whether to adopt the Alternative Vote system (67.9% No) and, finally, on 23 June 2016, whether to continue as a member of the European Union (51.89% No).

Over the years, there have been various regional Referendums, mostly concerning the devolution of powers to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales (notably the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014 – 55.3% No).

Although nationwide Referendums were firmly rejected in the early 1900s, the argument against them was not as strong for more localised Referendums and these were carried out from 1913. For example, in 1913 local areas in Scotland held Referendums on whether to implement the prohibition of alcohol. Of particular interest is that from 1881 pubs in Wales legally had to be closed on Sundays. In 1961, local areas of Wales were permitted to have a Referendum on whether they wanted Sundays to be ‘wet’ or ‘dry’ and for further Referendums asking the same question to take place every 7 years. Sadly, the Welsh pub Referendums were abolished in 2003.

Finally, since 1972 the people of local Parish areas have been able to call for a local Referendum, called ‘Parish polls’, to answer questions on community issues. These tend to be on local planning concerns and rarely have a turnout of more than a few hundred voters.

It is clear that Referendums are not new to English Legal History but are not by any means entrenched as an English democratic principle. Indeed, a system to govern Referendums was only put in place in 2000. The Electoral Commission oversees the conduct of Referendums and consults on how understandable the phrasing of the proposed Referendum question is. The recent EU membership Referendum has been so divisive that, on hearing a challenge, the High Court has held that Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (relating to the withdrawal of a Member State from the EU) cannot be used in the UK without an affirmative vote in Parliament.

The UK Government has stated it will appeal this judgment and we will have to wait and see what the appeal decision will mean for the future of Referendums in English Legal History. One thing is certain, party leaders are going to think very carefully before including Referendum promises in their political Manifestos in the future.

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History of the University of Law

 The University of Law’s Guildford Centre (Braboeuf Manor)

Before discussing the specific history of the institution, we must look briefly to the 18th and 19th Century history of legal education in general.

An early regulator asserting some form of professional control on solicitors was the Society of Gentleman Practisers in the Courts of Law and Equity, which was established in 1729 (for a full discussion of this regulatory development and Articled Clerks in general, please see my blog post on the History of the Training Contract). This body had the aim of improving the standards and reputation of solicitors.

In 1823, several attorneys related to this group desired the establishment of the London Law Institution, again to ensure good practice amongst solicitors. The Law Institution was established in 1825 (London having been dropped), although its full formal title was the Society of Attorneys, Solicitors, Proctors and others not being Barristers, practising in the Courts of Law and Equity of the United Kingdom. By 1903, it had changed its name to the Law Society, although it had been colloquially known as this for years beforehand.

The Law Society began lectures for Articled Clerks in 1833. However, mandatory requirements as to examination before entering, and during, your Clerkship were not introduced until 1860 and practical powers to conduct these examinations were not given to the Law Society until 1877. Initially, the Law Society employed a staggering 3 lecturers who each gave between 9 and 12 lectures annually. By 1863, tutorials were offered to support smaller groups of students and in 1879 a 4th lecturer was hired. Furthermore, in 1893, 2 tutors were hired to assist specifically with the tutorials.

The Law Society had an extensive library which was open every day between 9am and 9pm (except for a summer term when it closed at 6pm, or on Saturdays when it closed at 4pm). Articled Clerks were allowed to access the materials if they paid an annual subscription of £2.

This development built up to the Law Society opening its School of Law in 1903, an institution which by 1908 had 10 employees. In a trend as old as education itself, attendance at the Society’s lectures was low and actually declined due to the intense competition of a private legal tutorial firm, Gibson & Weldon, who opened their doors in 1876. Students were not obligated to attend lectures and 88% of those who took the Law Society’s examinations attended none of the Society’s lectures.

In 1922, the Law Society required a mandatory year of lectures before sitting the middle of 3 examinations, the Intermediate Examination. Gibson & Weldon was the Law Society’s fiercest competitor and the Society negotiated a merger between them and its School of Law in 1962. The combined body was called the College of Law. The College was created in its official legal form by a Royal Charter of 1975.

In a trend that has continued, the tuition fee for a 1 year course at the College of Law was expensive; £914 in 1979 and for full-time Legal Practice Courses (a course replacing the old Final Examination) starting in September 2015; £14,750 at the London centres. A major change to the College of Law occurred in 2012 when it was granted full University status and changed its name to the University of Law. The re-branding and implications of this change are still being implemented as at 2015 and are likely to continue for several years to come.

From 1962 and over the following decades, the College of Law established itself as the premier provider of legal education and is a universally known and respected name amongst the legal profession. A range of centres were opened at locations across the UK, alongside the offering of a variety of courses. The University of Law now offers an undergraduate LLB law degree and has recently announced an MSc Masters degree in Law, Business and Management.

The University continues to be at the forefront of legal education and is heavily involved in the development, facilitation and improvement of the provision of, and access to, legal education. For example, through its fledgling Legal Services apprenticeships and a foundation course enabling international students, on completion, to study at undergraduate level at the University.

The University of Law is an institution with deep historical roots and, considering the dynamic changes in the regulation of legal education and changes in how the legal profession needs to operate to thrive, we may see further changes in decades to come.

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Pirate Executions in Early Modern London

In the East London neighborhood of Wapping behind the Town of Ramsgate Pub lies a replica of a noose and hanging scaffold. This commemorates Execution Dock, most famous as the spot where pirates were hung for their crimes in early modern London.  Execution Dock was a place of execution for over four hundred years: the last execution to take place there was 1830.  Execution Dock served as the site for all fatally condemned maritime criminals, but the cruelest treatment was reserved for those to be hung for piracy.

‘A Perspective View of the River Thames’, 1780 (Photo courtesy of National Maritime Museum, PAD1370)

During the early modern period, the vast majority of criminals who awaited a fatal punishment were jailed in Newgate (now the location of the Old Bailey Central Criminal Court) and carted to Tyburn for a public hanging (now the location of Marble Arch).  Pirates and other maritime criminals, however, were instead often housed at Marshalsea Prison and carted southeast to Wapping for a public execution at Execution Dock.  Traditionally in English history, people were often executed at the place in which their crime occurred.  This was especially true with highwaymen, but over time the majority of criminal executions happened locally at Tyburn after incarceration in Newgate.  Pirates and other maritime criminals, however, still received traditional execution treatment by being carted down to the banks of the Thames. The Admiralty used Execution Dock as the symbolic location of the sea in which pirates committed their crimes.   

The High Court of Admiralty carried out the processes of pirates’ executions.  Initially established in the fourteenth century for early maritime legalities such as trade and funding overseas expeditions, the Admiralty Court had complete jurisdiction over maritime crimes by the mid-seventeenth centuries.  Once a pirate was captured, he was taken prisoner and shipped back to London to await trial and condemnation. Known as hostis humanis generis (enemies of all mankind), a pirate was immediately considered to be guilty before facing his trial.

The process of pirates’ executions had similarities to those hung at Tyburn, but there were key differences that set them apart from other criminals. As pirates were carted through the streets of London, they were led by a silver oar to symbolize the strength and authority of the Admiralty so all of London could see where the condemned were headed.  Once at the scaffold, the condemned pirate was expected to give the traditional ‘last dying speech,’ in which he would confess and atone for his crimes and warn others away from falling into his wicked way of life.  Pirates, notorious for their rebellious behaviour, sometimes used their speech as an opportunity to admonish cruel superiors.  

When this ritual was completed, the pirate would be hung by the neck until dead. However, his punishment was not a quick death. Nooses reserved for pirates were shorter than usual, causing a shorter drop and thus death by strangulation rather than a broken neck. This ritual became known as the ‘Marshal’s Dance’ because of the way the body would thrash around due to asphyxiation.  Generally, after a person’s execution, they were cut down from the scaffold immediately, but this was not so for pirates. The bodies of condemned pirates continued to hang at Execution Dock for a total of three tides to serve as a warning.  The most extreme case of this was of Captain William Kidd, executed for murder and piracy on the high seas, whose body remained strung up in the gibbets for three years to serve as a warning to other pirates.

‘A Pirate Hanged at Execution Dock’, c. 1795 (Photo courtesy of the National Maritime Museum, PAJ 0887)

Pirates were unperturbed by these gruesome warnings.  By the turn of the eighteenth century, pirates had grown so numerous that it became nearly impossible to transport captured pirates back to London because of the lack of an organized navy and the economic drain of transportation. After the British secured their Caribbean colonies from the 1670 Treaty of Madrid, which stipulated that the British would rid the seas of piracy, they decided to establish Admiralty Courts in Port Royal, Jamaica and colonial North America (Boston, Providence and Charleston). This allowed British legal jurisdiction to grab a firm foothold in their overseas colonies whilst regaining maritime order. It is no coincidence that Admiralty Courts were established in Jamaica right after the 1692 earthquake that nearly leveled the island. The complete rebuilding of Jamaica transformed the island from pirate haven to a ‘civil’ society.

The establishment of Admiralty Courts in North America had a large impact because for decades, local governors enjoyed amicable relationships with pirates until 1698. The Navigation Acts of 1660, which required all goods traded with British colonies in the Caribbean and North America to sail through England whilst barring North America from trading with other nations, encouraged smuggling and acts of piracy. Pirates would plunder ships, sell goods along the eastern seaboard and thus enjoy a bit of autonomy.  These happy privileges would end in 1698 when the Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy was passed.  This Act created official legal definitions of piracy and allowed for them to be lawfully ‘examined, inquired of, tried, heard and determined, and adjudged in any place at sea, or upon the land, in any of his Majesty’s islands, plantations, colonies, dominions, forts, or factories.’  This law expanded the Admiralty’s jurisdiction to the Caribbean and North American colonies.  These new laws along with the establishment of overseas Admiralty Courts caused a rapid decline of piracy until it was virtually eradicated from the Atlantic World by 1730.

Rebecca Simon, PhD Researcher, King’s College London, Department of History

Rebecca is based at King’s College London, researching the link between pirate executions and British sovereignty in the early modern Atlantic world. Prior to coming to Kings she earned an MA at California State University Northridge where she researched perceptions of piracy through the novel Treasure Island.

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